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Abstract
Existing studies offer conflicting analyses of the effect of the economy on voter turn-
out; some studies suggest that a poor economy leads to lower turnout while other 
studies find the opposite, or no significant effects. One reason for this ambiguity 
might be rooted in a limited understanding of how voters form attitudes about eco-
nomic performance. Previous research implicitly presumes that voters’ economic 
assessments are based solely on information about the retrospective domestic econ-
omy. In contrast, this study suggests that voters compare their nation’s economy with 
the economies of other nations. If the economy has an effect on turnout, the relative 
economy will affect voters’ evaluations, and consequently their decision to turn out. 
Employing ‘relative economy’ variables measured by media-identified spatial refer-
ence points across elections and countries from 29 democracies since the 1980s, this 
paper finds that a poor relative economy leads to lower turnout, while a good rela-
tive economy appears to have no effect. The finding has significant implications for 
the electoral effect of turnout, and thus on democratic accountability.
Keywords Retrospective vs. relative economy · Spatial benchmark · Voter turnout
How do macroeconomic conditions affect voter turnout? According to a ‘resource-
based’ view, increases in economic hardships actually reduce the level of surplus 
resources available to people, which eventually lead them to spend their limited 
resources on basic human needs rather than on political participation (the with-
drawal hypothesis) (Rosenstone, 1982; Southwell, 1988). Conversely, an abundance 
of resources leads to higher levels of turnout (Smets & Van Ham, 2003; Lipset, 
1960). Another strand of literature suggests the opposite. An adverse economy cre-
ates feelings of dissatisfaction with important aspects of life (Klandermans et  al., 
2001, p. 42) such as income and employment (Kern et al., 2015), and thus stimulates 
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citizens to voice their grievance by heading to polling stations on election days (the 
mobilization hypothesis).
In studies of turnout in more advanced economies, however, the question has 
often been approached from a different perspective, with scholars analyzing voter 
turnout with a ‘competence-based’ view. Here, the decision to vote depends upon 
whether or not a voter believes the government to be competent in handling the 
economy. For instance, scholars cite rising political distrust and falling levels of 
political efficacy and democratic satisfaction as evidence of the impact of macro-
economic conditions on voter turnout. This ‘competence-based’ analysis results in 
two opposing implications. In the first, economic hardships lead citizens to become 
frustrated with, indifferent to, and alienated from politics (Taylor, 2000). A nega-
tive economy signals to the public that the government is not capable of address-
ing such problems, which leads to a loss of confidence in representative institutions 
(Van Erkel & Van der Meer, 2016) and a loss of enthusiasm in political participation 
(Taylor, 2000). The alternative implication of the competence-based analysis sug-
gests that citizens under economic hardships are more prone to vote in order to seek 
redress for their discontent with the government’s economic incompetency (Schloz-
man & Verba, 1979; Kern et  al., 2015). One immediate way to express their dis-
content is to punish the incumbent government for its economic mismanagement by 
supporting opposition parties at the polls.
Albeit compelling, the ‘resource’ and ‘competence’ based theories of economic 
impact on voter turnout are not supported by evidence from most cross-national 
studies, which find no effects of economic fluctuations on voter turnout across 
regional samples including the US (Arcelus & Meltzer, 1975), Latin America (For-
nos et al., 2004), post-Communist countries (Fauvelle-Aymar & Stegmaier, 2008), 
and global samples in Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) and Blais (2000). In fact, both 
conflicting and null findings lead Blais (2006), in his comprehensive survey of the 
turnout literature, to conclude that “there is no clear relationship between the eco-
nomic conjuncture and turnout.” (117)
Radcliff (1992) points out that “In part, the confusion may result from measure-
ment and methodological shortcomings.” (444) Palmer and Whitten (1999) provide 
a first insight on the measurement of the economy when observing that voters “pri-
marily concerned with unexpected growth and inflation since unexpected economic 
changes have real income effects and serve as more reliable indicators of govern-
ment competence.” (Palmer & Whitten, 1999),  p. 625) Building on this line of 
research, and in response to Radcliff’s observation, this paper raises the question 
of whether economy variables are being properly introduced in the turnout mod-
els. Existing studies have predominantly employed temporally measured economy 
variables such as changes between different years in the level of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), unemployment, and inflation. Retrospective economy measures 
are appropriate when it comes to testing ‘resource-based’ hypotheses because they 
reflect fluctuations in income and material resources.
With regard to ‘competence-based’ accounts, the use of temporally measured 
economy variables, albeit useful, entails limitations for predicting how voters form 
opinions about incumbent performance. This is because citizens extract competence 
signals not only from the retrospective economy, but also, and more importantly, 
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from the relative economy. In other words, people tend to base their assessment of 
their government’s competence on comparisons between the state of their economy 
and that of other countries. Indeed, recent scholarship has investigated an ‘across-
nations’ yardstick as an alternative source of competence signal (Kayser & Peress, 
2012; Aytaç, 2018; Park, 2019). The spatially-benchmarked economy (or the rela-
tive economy) has been found to affect citizens’ electoral behavior significantly and 
does so more than the temporally measured economy (Kayser & Peress, 2012; Park, 
2019). Thus, the previous approach of employing retrospective economy variables 
cannot fully explain how voters arrive at economic evaluations, and as a result, will 
suggest an insufficient depiction of the relationship between the economy and voter 
turnout.
If the relative economy has more of an effect on voter attitudes toward their gov-
ernment than the retrospective economy, we should consider the possibility that the 
relative economy may better capture the competence signal of the government. In 
this regard, at least in testing for competence-based accounts, the relative economy 
variables would perform better in the turnout model with greater validity by measur-
ing what they are purported to measure. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no 
studies have incorporated the idea of relative economy in their voter turnout models, 
even when operating under competence-based (rather than resource-based) theoreti-
cal mechanisms. This paper attempts to fill the gap in the literature by employing 
the spatially-benchmarked economy to test ‘competence-based’ accounts over the 
link between the economy and turnout. The next section demonstrates how voters 
take into account information about the relative economy and how that information 
determines whether or not they will turn out to vote.
How Does the Relative Economy Affect Voter Turnout?
Similar to the Vote-Popularity function, which considers incumbent support to 
be influenced by the state of the economy,1 the underlying mechanism of the link 
between the economy and turnout, either through mobilization or withdrawal, is 
based on voter assessments of the incumbent’s competence in handling the econ-
omy. If voters wish to express their grievance about a poor economy by holding their 
government accountable at the polls, they must be able to extract the competence 
signal, which captures the extent to which shocks to the economy are perceived as a 
result of the competence of government (Duch & Stevenson, 2008). The same logic 
applies to the ‘withdrawal’ hypothesis. If voters become alienated from and indiffer-
ent to politics due to a loss of confidence in their government, and therefore become 
reluctant to participate in elections, they also have to be able to determine the extent 
to which economic hardships are exacerbated by the incumbent’s managerial skill. 
In other words, competence signals from incumbents are important factors in deter-
mining whether or not voters decide to show up at the polls.
1 For a review, see Stegmaier et al. (2017).
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However, voters may not be able to extract the competence signal from the 
observed economy (Duch & Stevenson, 2008). This is because the observed econ-
omy consists of two parts—competency shock and exogenous shock—and voters 
cannot reliably isolate one from the other. If adverse economic conditions are not 
driven by incumbent competency but rather by exogenous shocks, such as a global 
financial crisis or an oil shock, there is less reason to conclude that the poor econ-
omy can be blamed on the incumbent’s competency. As such, extracting competence 
signals from the observed economy is an important task for voters should they want 
to avoid inappropriate assessments of their elected officials. Thus, the first step that 
voters should take is to evaluate whether the current state of their economy is due 
more to an exogenous shock or incumbent competency.
Comparisons provide a heuristic shortcut in voters’ minds, which helps them 
extract competence signals from the composite parts of the observed economy 
(Duch & Stevenson, 2008). Although ordinary citizens commonly make both tem-
poral and spatial comparisons in their daily lives, scholars have predominantly used 
the temporal approach for comparisons in their turnout models. Specifically, studies 
examining the effects of the economy on voter turnout have mostly included eco-
nomic indicators derived from comparisons between current values and past values. 
By relying on one-dimensional comparison strategy, scholars unwittingly force vot-
ers to evaluate the state of the economy only by looking to the past in their turnout 
models.
Voters may perceive that the national economy is performing worse this year 
compared to the average growth from past years. However, that average growth 
could serve as a poor or incomplete benchmark if these voters also perceive that the 
economic growth of the current year in their country exceeds that of their neighbor-
ing countries. A temporal comparison, in this regard, is limited in its ability to help 
voters distinguish competency shock from exogenous shock, and therefore provides 
insufficient information about incumbent competency.
Spatial comparison therefore provides voters with useful information. For 
instance, if voters in Country A realize that their economy is declining in tandem 
with the economy of neighboring Country B (or the entire region’s economy), the 
voters in Country A will recognize the possibility of an exogenous shock rather than 
a competence shock. The decline in Country A’s economy would not be perceived as 
managerial incompetence when all other neighboring countries have undergone sim-
ilar economic adversity. By contrast, if the decline in growth rate is only observed in 
Country A while either no change in growth or even a positive growth rate appears 
in benchmarked Country B, it becomes apparent for voters in Country A that their 
economy’s poor performance is a sign of the managerial incompetence of their gov-
ernment. In sum, once voters extract the competence signal by making spatial com-
parisons, it is easy for them to make a decision on whether to turn out.
In the remainder of this section, four testable hypotheses are developed. These 
hypotheses predict variations in aggregate turnout levels based on relatively poor 
and relatively good economic conditions. Applying the logic of both withdrawal and 
mobilization theories, plausible arguments can be made for two opposing directions, 
increasing and decreasing turnout levels. Thus, hypotheses are posited in both direc-




Weschle (2014) suggests two ways in which poor economic management increases 
indifference among voters. If a group of voters supports the incumbent government, 
economic hardships will not necessarily lead them to support the opposition, who 
may be too far away from them on the political spectrum. However, they will also 
be reluctant to vote for the incumbent, whose poor economic management signals 
a lack of competence (Weschle, 2014). These voters are therefore more likely to be 
indifferent and stay at home on election days (Tillman, 2008; Pacek et al., 2009).
The relative economy also affects voter confidence in the incumbent in particu-
lar and in politics in general, which in turn impacts the level of turnout. Distrust 
in and dissatisfaction with politics are indeed often cited as strong predictors for 
low turnout (Karp & Milazzo 2015; Hooghe et al., 2011), and distrust in and dis-
satisfaction with politics among citizens have been shown to depend largely upon 
their evaluation of policy performance. More specifically, numerous studies have 
identified negative relationships between poor economic performance and political 
trust (Van Erkel & Van der Meer, 2016)2 and democratic satisfaction (Quaranta & 
Martini, 2016). Consequently, as people become disillusioned with political institu-
tions, democratic performance, and vote choice, they tend to turn out less in elec-
tions (Cox, 2003; Grönlund & Setälä, 2007). Building on this logic, a poor relative 
economy is expected to lead to a decrease in the level of turnout, and conversely, a 
good relative economy would be predicted to lead to a higher turnout.
Hypothesis 1a A poor relative economy will decrease the level of turnout.
Hypothesis 1b A good relative economy will increase the level of turnout.
The alternative framework suggests that voters ought to participate in elections 
more often when they perceive the economy to be poor (Schlozman & Verba, 1979; 
Southwell, 1988). In particular, when voters believe that the relatively underper-
forming economy can be blamed on incumbent incompetency, they are more likely 
to appear at polling stations to express their grievances by punishing the government 
with their vote for the opposition. Such grievance is often based on the relative level 
of perceived deprivation (Klandermans et  al. 2008) caused by the relative decline 
in the rate of economic progress (Gurr, 1970). Kern et al. (2015) have coined the 
phrase ‘collective relative deprivation’ for deprivation that occurs at an aggregate 
level, and they suggest that the collective assessment of economic adversity can 
increase levels of political participation (Kern et  al., 2015; Kriesi, 2012). In sum, 
voters who clearly feel relatively deprived by the poor relative economy will want to 
use elections to signal their grievance. This line of reasoning leads to the opposite 
expectation in H2a:
2 For a comprehensive review, see Van der Meer (2018).
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Hypothesis 2a A poor relative economy will increase the level of turnout.
The fourth hypothesis runs in the opposite direction. An over-performing econ-
omy can cause demobilization because voters assume that the incumbent parties 
are likely to win the election easily. In particular, economic voting literature sug-
gests that a good economy rewards the incumbent with increasing vote share. For 
instance, at an aggregate level, “for every percentage point of GDP growth in the 
election year, the incumbent stands to gain 1.4 percent of the vote” (Wilkin et al., 
1997, p. 307). Benton (2005,  p. 430) suggests a similar estimate of a 1.7 percent 
shift in incumbent vote share. The evidence is consistent in individual-level studies. 
Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck (2019: 105) find that the probability of an incumbent 
vote increases by about 23 percentage points when the economic evaluation of the 
voters moves from the extremes of ‘worse’ to ‘better’.
As such, if macroeconomic conditions favor the incumbent in an electoral race 
where there is less at stake, candidates and parties have less incentive to mobilize 
voters (Cox 1988). These favorable economic conditions are therefore also likely to 
dampen voters’ interest in politics (Karp & Banducci, 2008) and decrease turnout 
(Franklin, 2004; Pacek et  al., 2009) and political participation (Karp & Milazzo, 
2015). Pacek et  al. (2009) highlight this tendency by pointing to Roller et  al.’s 
(2005) report on a survey from post-communist countries which showed that two 
third of respondents agreed with the statement that “As long as things are getting 
on well, I’m not really interested in who is in power.” (476) Building on this line of 
reasoning, we can arrive at the fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b A good relative economy will decrease the level of turnout.
Overall, the mechanism presented in this study suggests a significant connection 
between relative macroeconomic conditions and voter motivation to turn out, but 
it is important to note that testing the above-stated hypotheses were performed at 
the aggregate level. Following the ‘funnel of causality’ in which various factors are 
organized in terms of a sequence of variables at different levels (Wass and Blais 
2017), the relative economy is considered as a distant cause and one of many con-
textual factors rather than an immediate cause such as the cost of voting or civic 
duty (463). Applying the structural chains of logic, voter confidence and trust in and 
satisfaction with politics and government are influenced by the relative economy as 
a contextual-level characteristic. In sum, the relative economy affects certain levels 
and portions of citizens who gain or lose motivation to turn out, which eventually 
impacts the aggregate levels of turnout in an election.
Model Specification
To verify above stated arguments, I adopt Arel-Bundock, Blais and Dassonneville 
(2021) who introduce an innovative way of testing the effects of relative economy 
in vote choice models. Although their research focuses on incumbent vote share as 
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an outcome variable, the empirical strategy that they suggest is not only applica-
ble but also the most appropriate to test the effect of the relative, such as under- or 
out-performing, economy in turnout models. As the concept of relative economy, by 
definition, is structured with two economies, domestic and benchmark, Arel-Bun-
dock et al. (2021) present the marginal effects of domestic growth as compared to 
benchmark growth in Fig. 1.3 The solid line indicates the domestic growth rate, and 
the dashed line shows the growth rate that voters use as a benchmark to evaluate the 
relative economic conditions.
When the domestic growth is held constant, the benchmark growth increases 
when we move from left to right in sub-figure (a). This invites a change in rela-
tive domestic economic performance from out-performance (i.e., the solid line is 
above the dashed line) to under-performance (the solid line is below the dashed 
line), denoted as 
2
 in Eq. (1). When this performance gap changes from ‘out’ to 
‘under’, my H1a predicts that turnout will decreases because voters become more 
indifferent and alienated from politics as they lose confidence in their government. 
Conversely, my H2a suggests the opposite: turnout will increase to blame/punish the 
government for their relative economic strain. In other words, the marginal effect of 
the benchmark growth should be positive if voters mobilize due to under-performing 
economy, whereas it should be negative if voters abstain from voting due to lack of 
confidences in government.
The scenario in sub-figure (b) predicts the opposite. When we move from left to 
right, the status of relative domestic economy changes from under-performance to 
out-performance, denoted as 
1
 in Eq. (1). Since the domestic economy becomes 
Fig. 1  Marginal Effects of Domestic and Benchmark Growth on Turnout. This is a simple display of 
Arel-Bundock et al.’s conceputal demonstration (Arel-Bundock et al. 2021, p. 439).
3 Note that Arel-Bundock et  al. (2021) use incumbent vote share as a dependent variable, whereas I 
examine voter turnout as the dependent variable.
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better than benchmark’s, the driving forces of mobilization such as dissatisfaction 
and grievances are now disappearing, but instead, such out-performance tends to 
lower the stakes of election by helping the incumbent win re-elections. Thus, turn-
out will decreases as H2b predicts. In contrast, a good relative economy instills a 
sense of trust and confidence in government, and satisfaction with the politics to 
the citizens, and consequently increases the portion of voters who are likely to turn 
out (H1b). As such the marginal effect of the domestic growth will be negative in an 
election with lower stakes, but it will be positive if the economy-driven confidence 
lead voters to polling stations.
Based on the intuition, Arel-Bundock et al. (2021) suggest an effective empiri-
cal strategy to test the benchmarking theories which has several merits such that 
it “directly translates the theoretical institutions of benchmarking hypothesis, and 
immediately reveals the relevant test statistics” (Arel-Bundock et al., 2021, p. 442). 
In the following model, I modify the dependent variable with Turnout:
In Eq, (1), the coefficient of Domestic ( 
1
 ) is the marginal effect of domestic growth 
on the voter turnout, and the coefficient of Benchmark ( 
2
 ) measures the marginal 
effect of the benchmark growth on turnout.4 That being said, 
1
 represents the mar-
ginal effect of domestic growth when the growth of benchmark is held constant, 
which indicates the out-performing macroeconomic conditions (sub-figure (b) in 
Fig. 1). The marginal effect of benchmark when the domestic growth is held con-
stant is represented by 
2
 , directing under-performing macroeconomic conditions 
(sub-figure (a) in Fig. 1).
Table 1 concisely summarizes the directions of the coefficients based on four dis-
tinct hypotheses. The sign of 
1
 (a good relative economy) should be positive when 
voters find strong competence signal in their incumbent (H1b), whereas it should be 
negative if the stakes of an election are lower with high probability of incumbents’ 
victory (H2b). Turning to a poor relative economy, the sign of 
2
 should be negative 
when voters lose their confidence and trust in and satisfaction with their government 

















Table 1  Theoretical 
expectations of Beta( ) 
coefficient on turnout
Hypotheses 1 (a 
& b)
Hypoth-




 : Out-performance + (b) − (b)

2
 : Under-performance − (a) + (a)
4 To see, take the partial derivative of Equation (1) with respect to Domestic, then it turns out that the 
marginal effect of domestic growth is 
1
 . The partial derivative with respect to Benchmark shows that 
2
 




To test the hypotheses empirically, I constructed a dataset consisting of 139 of par-
liamentary and presidential elections in 29 countries since the 1980s. As such, the 
unit of analysis is the individual election.5 The scope of the data restricts itself to the 
countries and times for which electoral results and media information are available 
in the ParlGov dataset (Döring & Manow, 2012). In particular, because I focus on 
relative economy using the media-coverage-based spatial reference points, explained 
below, the time dimension of the dataset is heavily restricted to data availability in 
Lexis-Nexis database.
The outcome variable is Voter Turnout, measured by the percentage of registered 
voters that go to the polls (Pacek et al., 2009; Powell, 1986; Blais & Dobrzynska, 
1998; Franklin, 2004, Dettrey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2009) rather than the other one 
measured as the proportion of the voting-age population that turns out to vote. This 
is because the latter might cause problems for cross-national comparability due to 
the exclusion of some groups in voting-age population in some countries (Blais 
et al., 2001).6 I obtain the data of turnout from the Voter Turnout Database of Insti-
tute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).7
The key explanatory variables are GDP growth rate and unemployment rate.8 
Since the core arguments of the paper lie in a ‘spatially-benchmarked’ economy, an 
immediate question such as “compared to what?” occurs. Social comparison theo-
rists have proposed a general theory of reference points by focusing on various crite-
ria such as familiarity, connectivity, and similarity (Yockey & Kruml, 2009). Based 
on this suggestion, Park (2019) attempts to identify unique spatial reference points 
across countries and elections by looking at the domestic media coverage. More spe-
cifically, to examine the distribution of domestic media message on ‘foreign’ eco-
nomic performance, Park (2019) collected the volume of news reports on foreign 
economies from a year prior to an election using Lexis-Nexis, which gives an idea to 
answer the question of “compared to what” for cross-sectional time-series analyses.9
Using Park’s (2019) media-identified reference points, I constructed two sets of 
benchmark. The first spatial reference point, called Benchmark 1, is the one which 
appears the most in one’s own domestic news media on foreign economy. It is also 
possible that multiple countries, such as X, Y, and Z, jointly appear in the country’s 
domestic news media. To consider these joint reference points, called Benchmark 2, 
5 The list of elections and years can be found in Online Appendix Table A3.
6 For a review on turnout measurement, see Online Appendix A in Geys (2006).
7 website: http:// www. idea. int
8 I obtained information on the GDP growth rate from Conference Board (2014), and information of 
unemployment rate from International Monetary Fund.
9 With regard to using media as the source of finding spatial benchmark(s), Park (2019) highlights two 
main channels of media, priming and framing, which assist citizens to form relative evaluations. For 
more discussion, see Park (2019) pp. 3–4.
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the weighted average of economic indicators from all three countries is used where 
the weights are given by the proportion of media coverage.10
Constructing relative economy based on media-guided spatial benchmark(s) 
seems not only the appropriate approach, but crucial to ensure empirical accuracy. In 
particular, in a cross-national time-series analysis, we are likely to employ common 
reference points such as global average economy if we are uninformed or misin-
formed about which country(ies) voters tend to benchmark in order to make a com-
parison. This approach, albeit convenient, is problematic because it assumes that 
voters across all elections and countries tend to be equally affected by the universal 
reference points. The relative economy variable, measured based on an inappropriate 
benchmark, is likely to induce measurement error in the independent variable, and 
thus, cause that Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation leads to an attenuation bias 
(Pischke, 2007). That being said, employing the key independent variable measured 
by using the theory-driven and media-guided reference points will reduce a threat of 
measurement error, and consequently ensure an accurate model-specification.
Figure 2 shows the variations in Domestic GDP (marked with dashed line) and 
Relative GDP (marked with solid line), using Benchmark 1 as a spatial reference 
Fig. 2  Variation in domestic and relative GDP across countries
10 A brief information about the Benchmark is available in the Information about Benchmark(s) section 
in Online Appendix, and the full information is available in the Supplementary Document of Park (2019) 
at https:// doi. org/ 10. 1016/j. elect stud. 2019. 102085.
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point.11 The variation in Relative GDP tells us a more detailed story. If the value of 
Relative GDP is positive, this means domestic GDP outperforms compared to the 
benchmark GDP. If the Relative GDP line falls below the zero line in the figure, it 
indicates that the domestic GDP underperforms compared to the benchmark GDP. 
Indeed, there is great within-country variation in the Relative GDP since the solid 
line fluctuates across the zero line in most of the countries in Fig. 2. This suggests 
that most of the countries in the sample do not deliberately benchmark a particular 
spatial reference point that is a consistently under- or out-performing country.
To account for rival explanations, I include various political and socioeconomic 
variables based on previous studies.12 I include Compulsory Voting variable.13 In 
decades of scholarship, a positive correlation between turnout and mandatory vot-
ing has been found (Powell, 1986; Gray & Caul, 2000; Fornos et  al., 2004). The 
effective number of parties that participate in the election is also controlled.14 
There are two competing arguments: (1) A larger number of parties increases the 
choice offered to the voters, enlarging the benefits of voting to the voters (Hansen, 
1994); (2) A larger number of parties increases the probability of coalition forma-
tion, which can decreases the direct effect of the voters in the choice of government 
(Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998). The former expects a positive effect of the number of 
parties whereas the latter expects the opposite. A dummy variable for presidential 
election is also included as the data contains both legislative and presidential elec-
tions.15 In addition, I account for election competitiveness, following the plausible 
expectation that citizens tend to turn out more in competitive elections because the 
marginal effect of any additional vote on the outcome is going to be larger the closer 
the race is (Powell, 1986; Franklin, 2004). It is measured as the absolute value of the 
percentage point difference in seat share between all governing parties and the oppo-
sition at a given election (Franklin, 2004).16
Population size and urbanization are also included. Based on Blais (2000), I 
expect that turnout will be higher in smaller countries because a single vote in a 
small state is regarded as having a higher probability of being decisive, inviting a 
larger effect in electoral outcome (Geys, 2006; Blais, 2000). With regard to urbani-
zation, the argument holds that people in cities tend to be more individualistic so 
that they face less ‘peer pressure’ to turn out (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968).17 Table A4 
in Online Appendix presents the summary statistics of variables.
12 In particular, the choice of control variables is guided by Geys (2006) which provides a comprehen-
sive review of aggregate-level research on voter turnout.
13 The information on compulsory voting is based on the IDEA dataset.
14 Bormann and Golder (2013).
15 Information on presidential election comes from Bormann and Golder (2013).
16 I obtained the data on seat shares of parties from Armingeon et al. (2016).
17 I collected data on the size of Population (in 1000’s using natural log) and Urbanization from World 
Bank (2020).
11 One noticeable point is that relative GDP tends to be lower than domestic GDP because, by definition, 
the relative value is calculated by subtracting the benchmark’s value from domestic one. However, when 
domestic GDP is positive and benchmark economy is negative, the relative GDP becomes greater than 
the domestic one such as Belgium (2010), Cyprus (2011), Estonia (2008), Latvia (2008, 2010), Poland 
(2010), the UK (2008), and the Netherlands (2010).
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Considering that the dataset is a cross-sectionally dominated panel (large N and 
small T) and an unbalanced panel (more elections included for some countries), I 
followed the suggestion of Beck and Katz (1995), who recommend OLS regres-
sion with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE).18 I also account for the serial 
dynamic of the voter turnout models by including a lagged dependent variable, thus 
making the analysis dynamic (Keele & Kelly, 2006). For robustness, and to deal 
Table 2  Effect of domestic and benchmark economy on voter turnout (PCSE and fixed effects)
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10 , **p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01
DV: Turnout Domestic Benchmark 1 Benchmark 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Previous Turnout 0.828*** 0.831*** 0.416*** 0.825*** 0.469***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.141) (0.059) (0.135)
Domestic GDP − 0.048 0.281 0.268 0.234 0.141
(0.162) (0.206) (0.228) (0.224) (0.216)
Domestic Unemployment − 0.034 − 0.057 0.006 − 0.026 0.042
(0.146) (0.140) (0.172) (0.133) (0.159)
Benchmark GDP − 0.595*** − 0.431*** − 0.699*** − 0.411***
(0.236) (0.201) (0.261) (0.157)
Benchmark Unemployment − 0.143 − 0.136 − 0.366* − 0.410
(0.157) (0.218) (0.207) (0.267)
Effective N. of Party − 0.351 − 0.334 − 0.716 − 0.343 − 1.028
(0.375) (0.325) (0.755) (0.274) (0.701)
Electoral Competition − 0.035 − 0.025 − 0.009 − 0.024 0.001
(0.032) (0.029) (0.036) (0.026) (0.039)
Presidential Election − 1.812 − 1.818 1.231 − 1.581 2.103
(3.195) (3.118) (3.011) (3.063) (2.916)
Population − 0.306 − 0.276 1.020 − 0.358 − 4.885
(0.280) (0.307) (9.954) (0.299) (8.944)
Urbanization 0.165*** 0.174*** − 0.107 0.141*** − 0.032
(0.046) (0.047) (0.219) (0.042) (0.195)
Compulsory Voting 3.077* 2.289 2.370
(1.461) (1.642) (1.487)
Constant 3.804 4.389 58.067 10.063 106.86
(1.461) (7.904) (92.05) (7.394) (85.98)
R
2 0.849 0.861 0.901 0.871 0.911
Elections 139 139 139 138 138
Countries 29 29 29 29 29




18 The models presented were run using the xtpcse command in Stata 16.
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with the threat of unobservable unit specific error in the composite error term, some 
models include Fixed Effects estimations.19
Results and Analysis
Table 2 presents the results of OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) 
and Fixed Effects estimations based on the empirical strategy which Arel-Bun-
dock et al. (2021) suggest. Model 1 is based on the conventional strategy including 
domestic economic variables measured by temporal comparisons (retrospective). 
The other four models incorporate international benchmark(s)’ economy. In model 2 
and 3, I use the first spatial reference point (noted Benchmark 1) which appears the 
most in one’s domestic news media on the macroeconomic conditions. Model 4 and 
5 are based on the joint spatial reference points (noted Benchmark 2) which is calcu-
lated by the weighted average of economic indicators from the three most appeared 
countries in domestic news messages. PCSE estimations are in Model 2 and 4, and 
Fixed Effects estimations are in Model 3 and 5.20
The first noticeable point is that the domestic economy appears to have no effect 
as shown in Model 1. The coefficients of both Domestic GDP and Domestic Unem-
ployment are statistically insignificant. Two interpretations can be made on this null 
finding. First, the null finding is consistent with Blais’ (2006) conclusion in that the 
economy has no impact on turnout. Perhaps at the macro-level tests we can only 
observe the total effects of two expectations (withdrawal and mobilization), which 
cancel each other as it does not distinguish between the two mechanisms (Radcliff, 
1992).
Second, the ambiguity may come in part from poor measures of the economic 
variable. Argued in the preceding section, the retrospective economy variable is 
insufficient in its ability to assist citizens in evaluating the health of the economy. If 
citizens receive more accurate and useful information on incumbent competence at 
handling the economy by ‘comparing’ their performance with others, the same way 
that individuals tend to ‘compare’ things in their daily lives, empirical tests using 
the retrospective economy variable will yield biased estimations.
To turn our attention to the central argument of the paper, we need to focus on 
Benchmark variable (noted as 
2
 in Table 1). According to Arel-Bundock et al.’s 
specification (2021), this indicates the marginal effect of the benchmark econ-
omy holding the domestic economy constant, so represents the scenario that the 
domestic economy underperforms the benchmark(s)’. As shown in Table  2, the 
coefficient of Benchmark GDP is statistically significant, and its effect is robust 
19 The Fixed Effects specification does not include variables that do not (or rarely) vary overtime within 
a country such as Compulsory Voting.
20 For robustness, I also estimate the same models using Prais-Winsten regression models with het-
eroskedastic Panel Corrected Standard Errors. The results, which are available in Table  A2 in Online 
appendix, remain robust. Furthermore, I tested how sensitive my main result is to the in- or exclusion of 
control variables, and find that the results for the main benchmark variables did not change.
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across two sets of estimation strategies and two sets of benchmark. The sign is 
negative, meaning that a poor relative growth compared to the benchmark(s)’ 
reduces the level of turnout.
The finding is in line with Hypothesis 1a (H1a), and thus of course would be seen 
as falsifying Hypothesis 2a (H2a), which predicts the opposite in that turnout will 
increase with a poor relative growth. However, from the macro-level analysis such 
as this, my data and models cannot directly test the effect of immediate factors in the 
‘funnel of causality’ such as individuals’ confidence or grievance on their decision 
to turn out or not. Thus, my finding increases the assessment of the probability that 
the effect of withdrawal (H1a) is stronger than the effect of mobilization (H2a) with 
a poor relative growth rate. Simply put, in the absence of a mobilization effect, the 
withdrawal effect might have even larger consequences on voter turnout.
Figure  3 presents the substantive impact of benchmark(s)’ growth rates, which 
plots the average predictive marginal effects on turnout at varying levels of 
benchmark(s) growth rate from the two PCSE models in Table 2. Sub-figure (a) is 
based on a single benchmark (Benchmark 1), and sub-figure (b) is based on joint 
benchmarks (Benchmark 2). The outer y-axis and the bar graph show the distri-
bution of Benchmark variables. The inner y-axis and solid line indicate the linear 
predicted values of turnout (%). The shaded area shows the 95% confidence inter-
vals. The figure clearly indicates that when benchmark(s) GDP growth increases, 
holding domestic growth rate constant (meaning that domestic growth becomes 
underperforming compared to the reference point(s)), turnout level also decreases. 
The predicted value of turnout is above 75% at the lowest value of GDP growth 
rate of Benchmark(s), however the predicted value of turnout reaches around 67% 
with Benchmark 1 and 64% with Benchmark 2 where the GDP growth rate of 
Benchmark(s) arrives at their maximum value.
Fig. 3  Predictive Margins of Benchmark(s) Economy on Turnout (CI 95%). The figure is based on the 
PCSE estimations (Model 2 and Model 4) in Table 2.
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Returning to Table 2, the Domestic variable (noted as 
1
 in Table 1) shows the 
marginal effect of domestic economy holding benchmark(s)’ economy constant, 
suggesting out-performing economic conditions. It is expected that a good relative 
economy increases turnout (H1b) with strong confidence in politics, or decreases 
turnout (H2b) as the electoral stakes diminish since the strong relative economy 
helps incumbents win the election. The positive sign of Domestic GDP is in line 
with former (H1b), but its statistical significance does not reach at the conventional 
level across all models. Thus, with respect to out-performing growth rate, neither 
H1b nor H2b is supported.
Figure  4, which plots each of the coefficients, further highlights the difference 
in the effects between under-performance and out-performance. The solid line rep-
resents the confidence intervals of the coefficients from PCSE estimations, and the 
dashed line represents the confidence intervals of the coefficients from Fixed Effect 
estimations in Table 2. The negative effect of the under-performing growth rates on 
turnout is apparent since the coefficient plots of Benchmark GDP (or 
2
 ) are blow 
zero, and the effects are robust in four models containing no zero line in their con-
fidence intervals. Conversely, the coefficient plots of Domestic GDP (or 
1
 ) suggest 
that out-performing growth rates have no impact on turnout.
This simple comparison might imply an observable implication in that vot-
ers react asymmetrically to the economic condition: They tend to react strongly to 
under-performing conditions, but their responses to over-performing conditions 
are not so much. This finding speaks to literature on ‘negativity bias’ in political 
behavior (Lau, 1982; Soroka, 2006). In particular, Lau (1982) notes that there is 
a tendency for “negative information to have more weight than equally extreme or 
equally likely positive information.” (353) Much scholarship has empirically shown 
that there is a clear negativity bias in media as it gives much more coverage to 
Fig. 4  Effect of domestic and benchmark(s) economy on turnout (CI 95%). For simplicity, the figure 
shows the key variables only although it is based on the full models in Table 2.
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negative economic news than positive (Soroka, 2006; Hetherington, 1996). Being 
exposed to this one-sided media, citizens appear to react asymmetrically to the 
economy itself. My finding shows evidence that voters are more sensitive toward 
relatively poor conditions, whereas their reactions toward relatively good conditions 
remain uncertain.
Turning our attention to the relative performance on unemployment, the coeffi-
cients of Domestic Unemployment and Benchmark Unemployment are never distin-
guishable from zero in all four models in Table 2 and Fig. 4, suggesting that there 
is no evidence of either withdrawal or mobilization hypothesis. This is the similar 
finding in that the benchmark unemployment has no effect in vote choice models 
(Kayser & Peress, 2012; Aytaç, 2018; Park, 2019).
Discussion
This paper has employed the concept of relative economy in order to provide an 
explanation for aggregate-level variation in voter turnout. Voter evaluations of 
a politician or political party’s skill at handling economy have been shown to be 
based on more than merely national economic conditions. Instead, voters tend to 
look to other countries’ economies to gauge the relative conditions of their econ-
omy. The relative economy provides voters with a competence signal indicating how 
well the incumbent is handling the economy. Existing literature suggests that a rela-
tively poor economy either leads voters to become inactive in elections due to their 
decreased confidence in government and alienation from and indifference to poli-
tics, or instead galvanizes voters to participate in elections in order to express their 
grievances actively and hold their government accountable at the polls. Similarly, 
an economy which out-performs relative to others is expected to either increase 
voter turnout because of the strong confidence in politics that it brings, or otherwise 
decrease turnout because the electoral stakes are lowered.
This paper’s finding indicates that voter turnout in a country decreases when that 
country’s economic growth rate underperforms compared to its reference country 
or group of countries. This is in line with the idea that poor economic performance 
leads voters to abstain from voting by lowering citizens’ confidence in their govern-
ment. Conversely, an economy that outperforms its benchmarks appears to have no 
impact on turnout. This implies that perhaps there is an asymmetry in voters’ reac-
tions to the relative economy. Voters are far more sensitive to relatively poor eco-
nomic growth than to relatively strong economic growth, which suggests a negativ-
ity bias in voting behavior. In sum, through the use of better measures of economic 
information, this research provides strong evidence supporting the withdrawal 
hypothesis.
The main contribution of this paper is that it is the first study (to the best of 
the author’s knowledge) that employs ‘spatially’ benchmarked economy variables 
in turnout models. Although existing literature implicitly assumes that resource-
based and competence-based economic mechanisms affect voter turnout, testing 
of the latter mechanism has been limited because of the sole reliance on ‘ret-
rospective’ economic information. Resulting explanations of voter assessment 
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of government are therefore incomplete and limited. Consider a situation where 
one’s own domestic economy is poorer than the previous year but currently per-
forming better than other countries’ economies. In this case, which competence 
signal, weak or strong, would voters capture?
If voters tend to use spatially benchmarked values for economic evaluations, 
using temporally benchmarked variables in a turnout model would lead to atten-
uation bias. Therefore, on average, the estimated Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
effect will be always closer to zero than it is supposed to be (Wooldridge, 2015). 
Perhaps this could explain the ‘null’ finding from most cross-national studies 
about the relationship between economic fluctuation and voter turnout. Since 
a temporally benchmarked economy variable can fail to help voters extract the 
competency signal and lacks validity in measuring what it is purported to meas-
ure, introducing spatially benchmarked economy variables into the turnout model 
has substantial potential benefit for empirical accuracy.
If spatial comparison is important, using appropriate reference point(s) is also 
crucial for conducting an accurate empirical test. Including an inappropriate or 
irrelevant reference point such as a universal benchmark would result in model 
misspecification, and consequently induce omitted variable bias. Thus, this paper 
has attempted to construct the best possible relative economy variables (a novel 
contribution to existing literature) by using media-guided spatial reference points 
per country and per election based on domestic news media.
The third contribution is that this research expands the scope of the bench-
marking hypothesis. Although the relative performance theory has been around 
for a long time, its applications have been very limited. This research attempts 
to expand the boundary of applications by looking at how voters react to relative 
economic performance when they make a decision to turn out. The finding of this 
research demonstrates the applicability of the benchmarking hypothesis to vari-
ous research topics in political science.
Although the weight of evidence points toward a negative relationship between 
a poor relative economy and turnout at the aggregate level, future research will 
be needed to pursue the issue that has been raised here. At macro-level tests, the 
relative economy variable has been understood as a contextual factor, which is 
a distant cause to explain the levels of turnout. However, a part of the under-
lying mechanisms of this paper relies more or less on micro-level understand-
ing, with issues related to the potential ecological fallacy, in that the relative 
economy either mobilizes or dampens motivations of ‘voters’, not of ‘countries’. 
Each chain of logic, from the economic conditions to the levels of trust, satisfac-
tion, and electoral stake, and from those factors to turnout, is carefully guided 
by existing literature; however, it would be useful to test how distant economy 
factors (contextual characteristics) influence immediate factors (individual char-
acteristics) at micro-level analyses. For instance, one interesting question is how 
a relative economy affects political trust, democratic satisfaction, and political 
efficacy. As discussed earlier, existing literature informs much about the role of 
the domestic economy on these psychological factors, but we are less informed 
about how relative economic performance affects the characteristics of voters and 
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their motivation to turn out. Thus, further investigations based on individual-level 
analyses would validate the ‘causal distance’ that this research employs.
Another extension to this research would examine the role of the media signal 
directly by measuring the ‘tone’ of the economic news reports. This paper assumes 
that citizens benchmark domestic economic performance with the assistance of the 
media, which disseminates information about the overall variances in shocks to their 
national economy compared to foreign economies. In this regard, it would be useful 
to directly model the tone of the economic news to see how economic information 
received by citizens is framed by media outlets. For instance, what factors influence 
how the media benchmarks? Do political parties and candidates make of an effort to 
take advantage of the way the media benchmarks? Under what conditions does the 
benchmarking become more salient? These questions, beyond the scope of current 
analysis, could promise fruitful ground for future research.
Finally, this paper suggests that variation in turnout is likely to have important 
electoral implications. In particular, given the ‘frozenness’ of party systems (Lipset 
& Rokkan, 1967), the impact of party mobilization in determining election out-
comes is eroding (Van der Brug, 2010), especially for countries that do not expe-
rience significant party system changes between elections. The waning impact of 
party mobilization means that elections are often determined by differential turnout, 
and the electoral effects of turnout have therefore increased (Hansford & Gomes, 
2010). For instance, a decision to turn out for a collective vote against the incum-
bent, perhaps as punishment for a troubled economy or an unpopular policy, will 
have a substantive effect on the incumbent’s re-election chances. The paper speaks 
to this expectation in that a poor relative economy may help the government by 
demobilizing the collective vote against the incumbent. This is good news for the 
unpopular incumbent, but bad news for democratic theorists since it weakens the 
accountability mechanism. That being said, those who lose confidence in their 
incumbent and would otherwise support the opposition are less likely to turn out 
(Radcliff, 1992), and thus the expected punishment is less delivered.
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org/ 10. 1007/ s11109- 021- 09736-4.
Acknowledgements The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comment, suggestion, and advice from 
Benjamin Radcliff and three anonymous reviewers. The author would also like to thank Michael S. 
Lewis-Beck, Mary Stegmaier, Laron Williams, Dan Bowen, Ruth Dassonneville, Gangsoo Jun, Kristian 
Wingo, and Aaron Kushner for their invaluable help and comments.
Data Availability The replication materials (both Data and Code) are available on the Mendeley Data 
repository under: "How does a Relative Economy Affect Voter Turnout?" (POBE-D-19-00329) at https:// 
data. mende ley. com/ datas ets/ hvhwm 2tybf/1.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
1 3
Political Behavior 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen 
ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Arcelus, F., & Meltzer, A. H. (1975). The effect of aggregate economic variables on congressional elec-
tions. American Political Science Review, 69(4), 1232–1239.
Arel-Bundock, V., Blais, A., & Dassonneville, R. (2021). Do Voters Benchmark Economic Performance? 
British Journal of Political Science, 51, 437–449.
Armingeon, K., Isler, C., Knopfel, L., Weisstanner, D., & Engler, S. (2016). Codebook: Comparative 
political data set 1960–2014.
Aytaç, S. E. (2018). Relative economic performance and the incumbent vote: a reference point theory. 
The Journal of Politics, 80(1), 16–29.
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995). What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data. American 
Political Science Review, 89(3), 634–647.
Benton, A. L. (2005). Dissatisfied democrats or retrospective voters? Economic hardship, political insti-
tutions, and voting behavior in Latin America. Comparative Political Studies, 38(4), 417–442.
Blais, A. (2006). What affects voter turnout? Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 9, 111–125.
Blais, A., & Dobrzynska, A. (1998). Turnout in electoral democracies. European Journal of Political 
Research, 33(2), 239–261.
Blais, A., Nadeau, R., Gidengil, E., & Nevitte, N. (2001). Measuring strategic voting in multiparty plural-
ity elections. Electoral Studies, 20(3), 343–352.
Blais, A. (2000). To vote or not to vote?: The merits and limits of rational choice theory. University of 
Pittsburgh Pre.
Bormann, N.-C., & Golder, M. (2013). Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946–2011. Elec-
toral Studies, 32(2), 360–369.
Cox, G. W. (1988). Closeness and turnout: A methodological note. The Journal of Politics, 50(3), 
768–775.
Cox, M. (2003). When trust matters: Explaining differences in voter turnout. J. Common Mkt. Stud., 41, 
757.
Dassonneville, R., & Lewis-Beck, M. S. (2019). A changing economic vote in Western Europe? Long-
term vs. short-term forces. European Political Science Review, 11(1), 91–108.
Dettrey, B. J., & Schwindt-Bayer, L. A. (2009). Voter turnout in presidential democracies. Comparative 
Political Studies, 42(10), 1317–1338.
Duch, R. M., & Stevenson, R. T.   (2008). The economic vote: How political and economic institutions 
condition election results. Cambridge University Press.
Döring, H. & Manow, P. (2012). Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov). An infra-
structure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies. 
Version, 12(10).
Van Erkel, P. A., & Der Meer, T. W. G. (2016). Macroeconomic performance, political trust and the Great 
Recession: A multilevel analysis of the effects of within-country fluctuations in macroeconomic per-
formance on political trust in 15 EU countries, 1999–2011. European Journal of Political Research, 
55(1), 177–197.
Fauvelle-Aymar, C., & Stegmaier, M. (2008). Economic and political effects on European Parliamentary 
electoral turnout in post-communist Europe. Electoral Studies, 27(4), 661–672.
Fornos, C. A., Power, T. J., & Garand, J. C. (2004). Explaining voter turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 
2000. Comparative Political Studies, 37(8), 909–940.
Franklin, M. N. (2004). Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in established democra-
cies since 1945. Cambridge University Press.
Geys, B. (2006). Explaining voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research. Electoral Studies, 25(4), 
637–663.
Gray, M., & Caul, M. (2000). Declining voter turnout in advanced industrial democracies, 1950 to 1997: 
The effects of declining group mobilization. Comparative Political Studies, 33(9), 1091–1122.




Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why men rebel. London: Routledge.
Hansen, T. (1994). Local elections and local government performance. Scandinavian Political Studies, 
17(1), 1–30.
Hansford, T. G., & Gomez, B. T. (2010). Estimating the electoral effects of voter turnout. American Polit-
ical Science Review, 104(2), 268–288.
Hetherington, M. J. (1996). The media’s role in forming voters’ national economic evaluations in 1992. 
American Journal of Political Science, 40(2), 372.
Hooghe, M., Marien, S., & Pauwels, T. (2011). Where do distrusting voters turn if there is no viable exit 
or voice option? The impact of political trust on electoral behaviour in the Belgian regional elec-
tions of June 2009. Government and Opposition, 46(2), 245–273.
Karp, J. A., & Banducci, S. A. (2008). When politics is not just a man’s game: Women’s representation 
and political engagement. Electoral Studies, 27(1), 105–115.
Karp, J. A., & Milazzo, C. (2015). Democratic scepticism and political participation in Europe. Journal 
of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 25(1), 97–110.
Kayser, M. A., & Peress, M. (2012). Benchmarking across borders: electoral accountability and the 
necessity of comparison. American Political Science Review, 106(3), 661–684.
Keele, L., & Kelly, N. J. (2006). Dynamic models for dynamic theories: The ins and outs of lagged 
dependent variables. Political Analysis, 14(2), 186–205.
Kern, A., Marien, S., & Hooghe, M. (2015). Economic crisis and levels of political participation in 
Europe (2002–2010): The role of resources and grievances. West European Politics, 38(3), 465–490.
Klandermans, B., Van der Toorn, J., & Van Stekelenburg, J. (2008). Embeddedness and identity: How 
immigrants turn grievances into action. American Sociological Review, 73(6), 992–1012.
Klandermans, B., Roefs, M., & Olivier, J. (2001). Grievance formation in a country in transition: South 
Africa, 1994–1998. Social Psychology Quarterly, 41–54.
Kriesi, H. (2012). The political consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe: Electoral 
punishment and popular protest. Swiss Political Science Review, 18(4), 518–522.
Lau, R. R. (1982). Negativity in political perception. Political Behavior, 4(4), 353–377.
Lipset, S. M. (1960). Party systems and the representation of social groups. European Journal of Sociol-
ogy/Archives Européennes de Sociologie/Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie, 1(1), 50–85.
Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives, 
vol. 7. Free press.
Van der Meer, T. W. G. (2018). Economic performance and political trust. In Oxford handbook of social 
and political trust, ed. Eric M. Uslaner. Oxford University Press chapter, 25, 599–616.
Pacek, A. C., Pop-Eleches, G., & Tucker, J. A. (2009). Disenchanted or discerning: Voter turnout in post-
communist countries. The Journal of Politics, 71(2), 473–491.
Palmer, H. D., & Whitten, G. D. (1999). The electoral impact of unexpected inflation and economic 
growth. British Journal of Political Science, 29(4), 623–639.
Park, B.  B. (2019). Compared to what? Media-guided reference points and relative economic voting. 
Electoral Studies, 62.
Pischke, S. (2007). Lecture notes on measurement error. London: London School of Economics.
Powell, G. B. (1986). American voter turnout in comparative perspective. American Political Science 
Review, 80(1), 17–43.
Quaranta, M., & Martini, S. (2016). Does the economy really matter for satisfaction with democracy? 
Longitudinal and cross-country evidence from the European Union. Electoral Studies, 42, 164–174.
Radcliff, B. (1992). The welfare state, turnout, and the economy: A comparative analysis. American Polit-
ical Science Review, 86(2), 444–454.
Riker, W. H., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1968). A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. American Political Science 
Review, 62(1), 25–42.
Rosenstone, S. J. (1982). Economic adversity and voter turnout. American Journal of Political Science, 
25–46.
Schlozman, K. K., &   Verba, S. (1979). Injury to insult: Unemployment, class, and political response. 
Harvard University Press.
Smets, K., & Van Ham, C. (2013). The embarrassment of riches? A meta-analysis of individual-level 
research on voter turnout. Electoral Studies, 32(2), 344–359.
Soroka, S. N. (2006). Good news and bad news: Asymmetric responses to economic information. The 
Journal of Politics, 68(2), 372–385.
Southwell, P. L. (1988). The mobilization hypothesis and voter turnout in Congressional elections, 1974–
1982. Western Political Quarterly, 41(2), 273–287.
1 3
Political Behavior 
Stegmaier, M., Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Park, B. B. (2017). The VP-Fuction: A Review. In J. Evans, K. 
Arzheimer, & M. Lewis-Beck (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Electoral Behaviour. Sage chapter 25.
Taylor, M. A. (2000). Channeling frustrations: Institutions, economic fluctuations, and political behavior. 
European Journal of Political Research, 38(1), 95–134.
Tillman, E. R. (2008). Economic judgments, party choice, and voter abstention in cross-national perspec-
tive. Comparative Political Studies, 41(9), 1290–1309.
Van der Brug, W. (2010). Structural and ideological voting in age cohorts. West European Politics, 33(3), 
586–607.
Wass, H. M., & Blais, A. (2017). Turnout. In SAGE Handbook of Electoral Behaviour, ed. J. Evans Arz-
heimer. K. and M. Lewis-Beck. Sage chapter, 20, 459–487.
Weschle, S. (2014). Two types of economic voting: How economic conditions jointly affect vote choice 
and turnout. Electoral Studies, 34, 39–53.
Wilkin, S., Haller, B., & Norpoth, H. (1997). From Argentina to Zambia: a world-wide test of economic 
voting. Electoral Studies, 16(3), 301–316.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2015). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach. Nelson Education.
Yockey, M. D., & Kruml, S. M. (2009). Everything is relative, but relative to what? Defining and identi-
fying reference points. Journal of Business and Management, 15(1), 95.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
